Saturday, November 27, 2010

Crude Oil Price Slumps as Inventory Jumps

ONG Focus | Insights | Written by Oil N' Gold | Wed Oct 27 10 11:12 ET

Total crude oil and petroleum products stocks rose +0.59 mmb to 1132.78 mmb in the week ended October 22. Crude oil inventory soared +5.01mmb to 366.21 mmb as stock-builds were recorded in all 5 regions. Cushing stock, however, slipped -0.35 mmb to 33.66 mmb. Utilization rate rose for a second week to 83.7%.

Concerning oil products, both gasoline and distillate stockpiles declined during the week. Gasoline inventory fell -4.39 mmb to 214.94 mmb while that for distillate dipped -1.61 mmb to 166.84 mmb. Gasoline demand jumped +5.25% to 9.36M bpd but was partly offset by increases in production (+1.86%) and imports (+28.24%). Similarly, +2.78% surge in distillate demand but was partly offset by increases in production (+3.25%) and imports (+35.71%).

WTI crude oil price tumbled to as low as 80.52 after the report. Commodity prices are weighed down by USD's rebounded ahead of the FOMC meeting. Stronger-than-expected durable goods orders and new home sales triggered speculations that the Fed may introduce a mild QE program next week.

Weekly change in inventory as of 22/10/10

Comparison between API and EIA reports: Forecast (using API's inventory level)

API collects stockpile information on a voluntary basis from operators of refineries, 76% of the time, using data in the past 4 years.

Source: Bloomberg, API, EIA

 

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The Kimberley Diamond

The Kimberley Diamond was originally a 490-carat rough stone, champagne colored and named after the Kimberley Mine in South Africa. It was first cut into a 70 carats diamond in 1921, and in 1958 the Kimberley Diamond was recut by its owners, Baumgold Bros., New York City, to improve the proportions and increase brilliancy. The new shape turned out to be a beautiful emerald shape and weighted 55.09 carats. It is one of the most far-famed emerald-cut diamonds in the world.  

This emerald cut was initially known as ‘step cut’ and was perfectly suited for emeralds, hence the name emerald cut. The emerald cut consists of 58 facets, 8 girdles, 25 crowns and 25 pavilions. The shapes can vary from squares to rectangles. Later this emerald cut was used while shaping hard stones and so it was also applied in case of the diamonds.

The Kimberley Diamond is very shining and has an effulgence quality as the bigger facets act as mirrors, reflecting the rays of light.

Baumgold Bros. sold the stone to an undisclosed collector from Texas in 1971. 

All famous diamonds 


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Risk-Off Trades Dominate. Commodities Slump as USD Strengthens

ONG Focus | Insights | Written by Oil N' Gold | Wed Oct 27 10 07:50 ET

Risk appetite remained weak in European session amid concerns about 'measured QE' policies. The dollar strengthened while growth currencies and other risk assets plunged. Aussie tumbled as inflation missed expectations. Focus in the US session will be on durable goods orders, new home sales and oil inventory data. Commodities fell across the board. The front-month contract for WTI crude oil slipped below 82 ahead of official oil inventory report. Precious metals and base metals also slumped on profit-taking.

The Wall Street Journal said that the Fed will likely announce a bond-purchase program, worth a few hundred billion dollar spanning over several months, at the FOMC next week. The amount would be significantly lower than market expectations of at least $500B over 5 months. Investors took profits from previous 'short-USD' trades as the selloff was probably over-extended with such a 'small' amount of QE.

Currently trading at 0.9715, Australian dollar plummeted for a second day against the dollar as CPI surprisingly eased to +2.8% y/y in 3Q10 from +3.1% a quarter ago. This may prolong RBA's pause in tightening. Other commodity currencies, New Zealand and Canadian dollars also fell. The RBNZ will leave the official cash rate (OCR) unchanged at 3% for a second month at today's meeting. The accompanying statement will also be dovish as led by disappointments from GDP growth and retail sales. Policymakers would reiterate that 'the pace and extent of further OCR increases is likely to be more moderate' that previously anticipated.

The base metal complex has been a bright spot in recent months with copper's rally probably the most eye-catching. LME copper for 3-month delivery has risen for 4 consecutive months since July and accumulated about +30% gains since then. The major reasons buoying the price are robust Chinese demand, quantitative easing outlooks, weakness in USD and expectations of launch of physically-backed ETFs. We believe the last 2 were factors driving the rise to recent highs.

Besides JP Morgan, BlackRock has also planned to issue an ETF backed by copper. According to filing documents, each share in the iShares Copper Trust will represent 10kg of copper. It is expected these investment instruments should send prices higher. However, the impact may only be temporary.

Take copper as an example. Supply tightness is evidenced by low inventory levels and mine production problems. It's not unlikely that ETF issuers will acquire the metal from producers. Rather, they will source from LME house, thus, exacerbating the decline in LME stock. In this case, copper price will be boosted initially but higher copper price will trigger sales of scrap copper and demand for substitution. Eventually, copper price will again fall from the peak.

 

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Real Bills and Gold

The Daily Bell published an interview with Dr. Lawrence H. White, Professor of Economics, George Mason University, on October 24, 2010. One of the questions the interviewer asked was this: “Please comment on real bills and how they work.”

            In his answer Professor White gave the following example. Joe the Baker buys flour from Bob the Miller and gives him a bill promising to pay $1000 in 90 days.

1.         There are several problems with this description. In actual fact it is not Joe who issues the bill but Bob. The bill is drawn by Bob on Joe who must accept it before it can have any value. In common parlance Bob bills Joe. Professor White puts the cart before the horse in confusing the concept of a bill with that of a note. A bill originates with the payee, the note originates with the payer. This is no hair-splitting. The difference is important. A note is evidence of debt. A bill is evidence of value to be added. There is no loan, no lending and no borrowing involved in Joe’s purchase and Bob’s sale of the flour. None whatever. The transaction cannot be understood except in the context of merchandise maturing into the gold coin that only the ultimate consumer can release — a process that makes the relationship between Joe and Bob one of coordination rather than one of subordination. If anything, Bob could be considered the subordinate. Joe is one step closer to the boss, the consumer, and he is the one to get the gold coin first. He dispenses bread that is in general demand. Everybody eats bread. Flour that Bob dispenses is only in special demand. It is not as “liquid” as bread, if liquidity of (finished or semifinished) products is defined by how far removed from the consumer’s gold coin they are.

            It is preposterous to suggest that Bob is the lender and Joe is the borrower. The two men are partners in a joint enterprise, made ad hoc, in order to provide the consumer with bread. Their role is like that of the two blades of a pair of scissors: neither can do the job by itself. This is not to deny that Bob extends credit to Joe. But extending credit is not the same as lending. To suggest that Joe is in debt to Bob as a result of borrowing is entirely fallacious. Joe is in a very strong position: the bill he has accepted can circulate as money for 90 days. The note of a mere borrower cannot.

2.         Professor White goes on to say that Bob the Miller can either wait 90 days for his money, or he can go to a bank and sell his bill. The banker will pay Bob something less than $1000 because he takes interest due for 90 days out of the proceeds.

            Again, there are several problems with this description. The main one is the suggestion that banks are necessary for real bills to be effective and useful. This representation makes facts stand on their head. The question whether bills came first or banks is not a “chicken or egg” problem. We have the facts certified by Ludwig von Mises, no friend of the Real Bills Doctrine, that bills did. Moreover, we have it on the authority of Adam Smith that real bills do circulate as money on their own wings and under their own steam. By contrast, legal tender bank notes circulate by virtue of the strong arm of the government.

            It would have been more correct for Professor White to say that Bob, if he wanted cash (read: gold coins) immediately, then he would go to the bill market and discount his bill (read: exchange it for gold coins at a price discounted by the number of days remaining to maturity, at the prevailing discount rate). But the beauty of real bills is seen in the fact that if all Bob wants to do is to pay for the shipment of grain that is being unloaded at his mill, then he does not have to go to the bill market to get gold. He can simply endorse the bill drawn on Joe, and Dick the Grain Merchant will be glad to take it in payment.

            I repeat: the $1000 face value of the bill does not represent debt and the discount does not represent interest on debt. Rather, it represents value to be added to the underlying merchandise and it is incumbent upon Joe the Baker to accomplish this feat. Time preference has nothing to do with it. The height of the discount rate is governed by considerations entirely different from those governing the height of the rate of interest, as we shall presently see. Confusing the two rates is the worst mistake economists have ever made, and are still making.

3.         Professor White condescendingly admits that bills, while they were still tolerated, used to command a low interest rate because of their “low default-risk”. This remark confuses the issue further. Risk of default has nothing to do with the height of the discount rate which is not determined on a case-by-case basis but, rather, across the board. In fact the risk of default is so low that it can be taken to be zero. I ask you: how many bakers go bankrupt for each banker that does?

            To understand what determines the height of the discount rate, as opposed to that of the rate of interest, we have to go not to the saver but to the consumer. The height of the discount rate is determined, not by the propensity to save, but by the propensity to consume. In more details, the discount rate varies inversely with the propensity to consume (whereas the rate of interest varies inversely with the propensity to save).

            A higher propensity to consume means that Joe the Baker experiences increased cash-flow (really, an increased flow of gold coins). It prompts him to get rid of the gold coins by prepaying his bill outstanding. Rather than buying back the bill he has accepted, which may have been endorsed and passed on a dozen times and would be next to impossible to track down, he simply goes into the bill market and buys any bill with three good signatures. The demand for bills has thus increased, making the bill price rise. This means that the discount rate is lower as a direct result of an increase in the propensity to consume. Conversely, a decline in the propensity to consume decreases demand in the bill market as retail merchants have a reduced cash flow and fewer gold coins to get rid of in prepaying their bills outstanding. Decreased demand shows up as a lower bill price or, what is the same, a higher discount rate.

            Our argument clearly shows that the credit represented by real bills has absolutely nothing to do with the propensity to save. The source of commercial credit is not savings, it is consumption.

            The reason why real bills have been and are badly misunderstood by most students of credit is a poor understanding of gold itself, and the “next best thing” to gold. Undoubtedly, the next best thing to gold is the bill of exchange representing merchandise in most urgent demand that is moving apace to the ultimate gold-paying consumer, and will be purchased by him before the season of the year changes (causing fundamental changes in the character of consumer demand) that is, in not more than 90 days. The process of supplying the consumer is a maturation process of merchandise which we figuratively describe as the maturing of the real bill into gold coins.

            The consumer is fickle, and changes in his taste are unpredictable (to say nothing of hers). The army of merchants and producers must stand on their toes to serve consumer demand efficiently and instantaneously. It is the gold coin that makes the consumer king. If you removed gold coins from circulation, as European governments started doing exactly 100 years ago, then merchants and producers would start serving another sovereign. From then on, they would rather serve the issuer of “legal tender” bank notes. This change in the person of the sovereign corrupted the economy and caused an upheaval in the Wealth of Nations.

4.         Professor White says that “real bills were an important source of business credit in the 19th century, and a major category of assets in a typical bank portfolio.” This sounds as if our grandfathers lived in backwater unmindful that there are other, more appropriate sources of commercial credit. The fact is that it was not progress or enlightened thinking but, rather, lust for power, desire to conquer, chicanery, malice, and vindictiveness on the part of certain governments that eliminated real bill circulation.

            Two dates stand out. (1) In 1909 first the French government and then, hard on its heels, the imperial German government introduced legislation making the note issue of their central banks legal tender. This paved the way towards financing the coming war with credits. (2) In 1918 the victorious Entente powers decided to block a spontaneous return of real bill circulation for they were afraid of multilateral trade. They would have liked to continue the wartime blockade of Germany. As there is no such a thing as peacetime blockade, they had to settle for something less: replacing blockade with blocking (real bills circulation, that is). This meant replacing multilateral with bilateral trade. Or, to call a spade a spade, replacing indirect with direct exchange alias barter — a relapse to conditions prevailing during the Stone Age. Through bilateral trade they hoped to monitor and, if need be, control German imports and exports. Under multilateral trade monitoring would be more difficult if not impossible.

            The collapse of the international gold standard was the direct consequence of this malicious and vindictive decision. The gold standard could not survive the destruction of its clearing house: the bill market — its most vital organ.

            The world is still suffering the consequences. “Structural unemployment” was perfectly unknown while real bills were financing multilateral trade. The elimination of real bill circulation has destroyed the wage fund out of which the wages of workers producing consumer goods can be prepaid. Prepaid, to be sure, because the ultimate consumer’s gold coin may not be available to pay wages for up to 90 days. However, the pay envelope must come weekly, rather than quarterly so that the Lord can “give us our daily bread”. Thus, in a real sense, the Lord’s Prayer is also a prayer for a speedy return of real bills circulation.

            Structural unemployment, plus periodic outbursts of a horrendous tide of unemployment was the result of the destruction of the wage fund. The 1930 episode was blamed on the gold standard. This argument has been exploded by events during the present GFC which, in the fullness of times, will be far worse as far as unemployment is concerned than the earlier episode. Real bill circulation has been eliminated along with the gold standard, yet unemployment is still with us. And, curiously, no one is inquiring how it can be that the removal of these two arch-enemies of government omnipotence has not removed the threat of deflation, depression, and unemployment — as promised by Keynes and other false prophets. 

            I shall continue my comments with a concluding article entitled More Real Bill Fallacies.

Antal E. Fekete

DISCLAIMER AND CONFLICTS
THE PUBLICATION OF THIS LETTER IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND AMUSEMENT ONLY. THE AUTHOR IS NOT SOLICITING ANY ACTION BASED UPON IT, NOR IS HE SUGGESTING THAT IT REPRESENTS, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, A RECOMMENDATION TO BUY OR SELL ANY SECURITY. THE CONTENT OF THIS LETTER IS DERIVED FROM INFORMATION AND SOURCES BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE, BUT THE AUTHOR MAKES NO REPRESENTATION THAT IT IS COMPLETE OR ERROR-FREE, AND IT SHOULD NOT BE RELIED UPON AS SUCH. IT IS TO BE TAKEN AS THE AUTHORS OPINION AS SHAPED BY HIS EXPERIENCE, RATHER THAN A STATEMENT OF FACTS. THE AUTHOR MAY HAVE INVESTMENT POSITIONS, LONG OR SHORT, IN ANY SECURITIES MENTIONED, WHICH MAY BE CHANGED AT ANY TIME FOR ANY REASON.

Copyright © 2002-2008 by Antal E. Fekete - All rights reserved


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Is the Unrigged Silver Market Set To Explode?

At long last, a light of truth is shining into the dark corners of the silver market. The results could be explosive.

"The silver market is an inside job."

I'd been hearing that accusation for over ten years -- since my days as a commodity broker in the late 1990s. It was widely believed that the silver market (trading for less than $5 per ounce at the time) was rigged.

It's been a long time coming. But last week, the accusers finally got some satisfaction. As the WSJ reports,

A Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulator is putting pressure on the agency to take action in a high-profile, two-year-old investigation of the silver market.

At a CFTC hearing Tuesday to consider new rules to strengthen its commodity-enforcement powers, commissioner Bart Chilton said market players have made "repeated" and "fraudulent efforts to persuade and deviously control" silver prices.

Mr. Chilton said he believed there have been violations of CFTC rules that should be prosecuted, though he couldn't publicly disclose trader names...

And then came the lawsuits. Quick on the heels of the CFTC news, J.P. Morgan and HSBC were sued for silver manipulation in a New York court of law. (J.P. Morgan is the megabank that swallowed Bear Stearns. HSBC is a behemoth with British Empire roots dating back to 1865.)

The Morgan / HSBC suit alleges that:

...between in or about March 2008 and continuing through the present, Defendants have combined, conspired and agreed to restrain trade in, fix, and manipulate prices of silver futures and options contracts... Also during the Class Period, individual Defendants have intentionally acted to manipulate prices of COMEX silver futures and options contracts...

The two banks are accused of reaping hundreds of millions to billions in illegal profits, by way of bearish collusion that represented as much as 85% of all net short positions in the silver market.

Because the suit seeks class action status -- and because the CFTC commissioner has openly acknowledged shady dealings -- it is unknown how much legal risk this poses to Morgan and HSBC.

But putting that aside, the truly interesting question is this. If the manipulators have been holding silver down all this time, what happens next?


The silver to gold price ratio is a simple way to measure which metal is outperforming.

For much of 2010, silver had been either treading water (relative to gold) or lagging behind a bit. But then suddenly, as you can see from the chart above, the silver market just got up and went...

As the plaintiffs in the Morgan / HSBC lawsuit wryly suggest, this shift in tone might -- just might! -- have something to do with the silver manipulators deciding to lay low, thanks to an uncomfortable spotlight being shone upon them.

(If you would like to read more of my investment commentary on other topics, sign up for Taipan Daily.)

If the crimes of the manipulators are anywhere near what they are made out to be -- if only a fraction of the accusations are true -- then the silver market could arguably be considered one of the greatest "short squeeze" candidates in the history of markets.

As Daniel Drew liked to say (before Commodore Vanderbilt made him eat his own words): "He who sells what isn't his'n / Must buy it back or go to pris'n." If things get truly nutty as the flushed-out banks are forced to cover, there is no telling how high silver could go.

And in addition to the manipulator exposure angle, there is the little manner of China -- the third largest silver producer in the world after Peru and Mexico. As Bloomberg reports,

Silver exports from China, the world's largest, may drop about 40 percent this year as domestic demand from industry and investors climbs, according to Beijing Antaike Information Development Co.

"There is huge demand in China this year and that has affected exports, which were already hurt after the tax rebate was abolished," said Ng Cheng Thye, head of bullion at Standard Bank Asia. "The demand is coming from all areas, including jewelry, investment and fabrication and this has resulted in a physical market shortage in the Far East."

And then, of course, there are the dollar-destroying actions of the "bearded clam," aka Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve.

If the Fed's first "QE" installment (surely you know those initials by now) is deemed a disappointment this week, precious metals could take a hit. But if Ben delivers, or if conviction rises of a likelihood for QE episodes 3 and 4 and 5, the n watch out.

Justice Litle

Taipan Publishing Group

Justice Litle is the Editorial Director of Taipan Publishing Group, Editor of Justice Litle’s Macro Trader, and Managing Editor to the free investing and trading e-letter Taipan Daily. His articles have been featured in Futures magazine, he has been quoted in The Wall Street Journal and has even contributed regular market commentary to Reuters and Dow Jones.

Article brought to you by Taipan Publishing Group. Additional valuable content can be syndicated via their News RSS feed.  www.taipanpublishinggroup.com.

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Article originally published at the following address


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Gold and 11 Zeroes, Part II

How the one-trick "inflation hedge" more than trebled amid the modern world's template deflation...

LET'S IMAGINE the central bankers are right.

Let's say that – rather than actually ending a two-decade deflation – the price of clothing to Western consumers is only now set to turn lower.

Let's agree that the doubling of central-bank foreign reserves since 2005...plus the worst sub-zero real rates of interest since the mid-70s...will count for nothing in global energy or food prices.

Let's also say, despite all experience since the credit crunch bit in 2007, that the "output gap" theory – those "low rates of resource utilization" as the Fed put it on Wednesday – finally comes good, and so excess capacity conspires with slack demand to pull costs lower.

Let's imagine, in short, that money actually starts to gain value. What then?


Back in 2002, three years after Japanese consumer prices began falling and one year after the Bank of Japan first embarked on quantitative easing to try and reverse that trend, Tokyo's Economic & Industrial Policy Bureau organized a survey of consumer experiences. (A big thank-you to Atsuko Whitehouse of BullionVault Japan for this research, by the way...)

All told, 80% of respondents in 2002 said they felt some level of deflation in prices. A little over 25% felt deflation "very strongly", in fact. And only 1% said there had there been no deflation in their experience.

Yet gold prices in both the Tocom futures market and in Tokyo's Ginza shopping district had risen 37% regardless. That gave early buyers of the ultimate (and apparently one-trick) "inflation hedge" a better than 40% gain in real terms.

Sure, the price of gold globally had also been rising. And Japan's gold-friendly deflation came as the Yen fell on the forex market, extending the Dollar-price rise by 16% for Japanese buyers. But throughout its long, soft depression – and until 2009 – Japan was the world's second-largest economy, with the world's second-largest stock market. Thanks to Tokyo's swollen government spending since consumer prices peaked in 1998, it's since gone from the second-largest to No.1 bond market, too.

So we shouldn't dismiss Japan's experience as a mere footnote or outlier. It certainly suffered deflation in domestic risk-asset prices and credit supplies too, if not in the actual volume of money supplied to the economy. (As in the US and UK, base money grew fat and squatted on bank balance-sheets thanks to quantitative easing; it failed to pile new debt on top of the then-record total.) While government bonds rose in price, yielding just-about real returns thanks to those gently slipping consumer prices, the Nikkei index of stocks fell by more than a quarter. Real estate, having already lost one fifth over the previous decade nationally – and after more than halving in the 6 biggest cities – lost another fifth again.

The only major economy to hit deflation since before the Second World War, Japan thus offers our only template for what a modern deflation might look and smell like. Hence its obsessive hold on central-bank chiefs and would-be policy-makers (Ben Bernanke at the Fed, Adam Posen at the Bank of England, Paul Krugman everywhere). Hence BullionVault's quick survey of Japan's investment landscape since 1998. Because it looks remarkably like the ground opening up before US and UK investors tonight.

* Cash pays zip – ZIRP, in fact, thanks to the zero interest-rate policy pioneered (to no effect) by the Bank of Japan a decade ago;

* No bargain in stocks – the S&P might be very much cheaper from its price/earnings peak of 45 back in 2000, but it's still above 20, while Japan's stock market only now trades at 15 times earnings – an historical discount to be sure, but hardly a single-digit bargain;

* Flight into bonds – where Tokyo led, Washington and even Westminster now follow, issuing record volumes of debt at record-low yields to pension and insurance funds hungry for a "risk-free" zero return;

* Caution thwarted – forced to seek risk by miserable dividends and interest rates, otherwise cautious savers turned to high-yield bonds, emerging markets, currency trading, and precious metals investment.

"Domestic uncertainties spur Japanese investment," the World Gold Council's quarterly Gold Demand Trends reported at the close of 2001. Physical gold demand from private Japanese citizens then rose another 24% in 2002, swelling again in 2003 only to rise by 26% by physical volume in 2004.

That year, and for the second time since 2002, the Bank of Japan announced a cut in its ceiling for bank-deposit cover (equivalent to the FDIC), capping insurance at ¥10 million ($90,000). That really meant something, as the WGC noted, in a nation of "occasional bank failures" where "56% of household investments are held in bank accounts." Spooked by the fear of a truly deflationary uninsured bank failure, retail gold investment demand surged by 42% in tonnage terms in 2004, rising by nearly 50% by Yen value from 2003 to ¥103 billion ($1bn at the time). And right alongside, four years of ZIRP had forced a far greater quantity of Japan's famous cash-savings to seek better-than-zip elsewhere as well.

The initial period of Japanese deflation – marked by sinking interest rates and gently falling consumer prices – brought a series of mis-selling scandals in high-yield foreign bonds. Well, they were only scandals after Russia and then Argentina defaulted, of course. No-one much minded when they were paying (and the lesson went unlearned too, of course). Average daily volumes in the Tokyo foreign exchange market meantime rose 18% between 2003 and 2006 according to Bank of Japan data, but the Watanabes didn't really get hooked until the finance industry spotted the trend, and created retail-friendly products for leveraged currency speculation.

The Tokyo Financial Exchange, for instance, launched its Click365 forex platform in 2005...


Sound at all familiar? It isn't just gold bullion that catches a bid when the returns paid to cash fall to zero. And absent a sharp decline in consumer prices – rather than the low single-digit declines seen year-on-year in Japan over the last decade – it isn't just US consumers who might doubt the official cost-of-living data either.

A consumer survey run by the Bank of Japan found people felt inflation was running above 3.0% per year in Sept. 2009. After reporting a slight dip this spring, the 4,000 adults responding to Oct. 2010's survey pegged the true rate of consumer-price inflation at 1.3% per year...eating almost all of the 15-year Japanese government bond's current yield (5-year debt yields 0.3%) and delivering negative real-returns-to-cash almost as bad as those now suffered by US and UK savers.

To repeat – two things happen to gold investment when the returns paid to cash fall to zero:

* First, the missed interest that you'd otherwise earn holding cash-on-deposit vanishes. Gold still pays you nothing, of course, but neither does cash. So the opportunity cost of owning gold is removed;

* Second, and only slowly...over time...more and more people come to feel (if not realize) that putting cash in the bank guarantees a loss of real value. Because if inflation is 8.3% but interest rates are only 6.7% (United States, official CPI, winter 1973) – or if inflation is 1.5% but interest rates are zero (official US inflation, summer 2010; Bank of Japan consumer survey, last twelve months' average) – you can be sure your money will buy you less stuff one year from now. So you start seeking an alternative store. And gold's rarity, indestructibility and deep, liquid market make it the obvious choice, even though it still pays you nothing. Because at least it's not cash, which in a world of zero or sub-zero real rates must also be multiplying faster than gold miners can dig new ore out of the ground.

Anyway, thought experiment over. Because that brings us full circle...back to positive inflation and negative real rates...but with 600 billion extra dollars about to pumped into global asset and commodity prices by today's deflation-fearing Federal Reserve.

Adrian Ash

Head of Research

Bullionvault.com

You can also Receive your first gram of Gold free by opening an account with Bullion Vault : Click here.

City correspondent for The Daily Reckoning in London, Adrian Ash is head of research at BullionVault.com – giving you direct access to investment gold, vaulted in Zurich, on $3 spreads and 0.8% dealing fees.

Please Note: This article is to inform your thinking, not lead it. Only you can decide the best place for your money, and any decision you make will put your money at risk. Information or data included here may have already been overtaken by events – and must be verified elsewhere – should you choose to act on it.


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World Markets Tumble as G20 Fails to Resolve Tensions. OPEC, IEA Raise Oil Demand Forecasts

ONG Focus | Insights | Written by Oil N' Gold | Fri Nov 12 10 06:49 ET

G20 leaders released a communiqué after the summit in South Korea, pledging to achieve 'strong, sustainable and balanced growth in a collaborative and coordinated way'. However, financial ministers' refusal to join the US in pressuring China to appreciate RMB signals currency and trade disputes will persist for some time. More importantly, G-20 leaders spent a considerable time discussing Europe's debt problems, intensifying worries that the EU may need to bail out some of the peripheral countries.

Financial markets tumbled as Europe's debt crisis worsened and the prospect for Chinese rate hike has increased. The dollar rebounded against major currencies. In the commodity sector, the benchmark contract for WTI crude oil dived to as low as 85.48 in European session. Gold slumped amid broad-based selloffs in commodities with the benchmark contract plunged to a 1-week low of 1377.3.

Despite short-term volatility, oil agencies remained confident in the oil market. OPEC raised its global oil demand forecasts for 2010 and 2011 as consumptions in advanced countries should improve amid economic recovery. According to the cartel holding 40% to the world's total oil output, World oil demand will reach 85.8M bpd in 2010, up +1.3M bpd from 2009 and +0.2M bpd from October's forecast. Consumption in the OECD has outpaced expectations as various stimulus plans have driven up economic activities. The forecast for world oil demand in 2011 has been revised up to 86.9M bpd, up +1.1M bpd from 2010 and +0.3M bpd from previous projection. The improved outlook for OECD demand is a key factor behind this adjustment.

While demand outlooks were higher, productions from non-OPEC countries, and OPEC NGL and non-conventional remained largely unchanged from October's forecasts. Therefore, demands for OPEC's supply were revised up to 28.8M bpd and 29.2M bpd for 2010 and 2011 respectively.

In its latest report, the International Energy Agency also upgraded the global oil demand forecasts to 87.3M bpd in 2010, up +2.6M bpd from 2009 and +0.4M bpd from October's projection, as both OECD and non-OECD posted stronger-than expected demand readings in 2010. Outlook for 2011 was revised higher to 88.5M bpd, up +1.2M bpd from 2009 and +0.3M bpd from previous projections. Supplies will continue to come mainly from non-OPEC countries but calls for OPEC increased in both this and next years as growths in non-OPEC supplies do not match with demand growths.

Although monetary tightening may curb commodity consumptions, other measures from China may help boost oil prices. The Chinese government's control on power supply has led factories to using their own power generations. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China's oil processing in October rose +12% y/y 8.8 M bpd. Meanwhile, there are increasing expectations that China may return to a net importer of diesel after being a net exporter since October 2008. Indeed, China's net exports of diesel fell for a second consecutive month to 55K bpd in September.

 

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